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THE PARADOXES OF NATIONAL
SELF-DETERMINATION©
BY BRIAN

Some have argued that the right of national selfdetermination gives every national group the power to
decide for itself whether to remain part of an existing
state or to secede unilaterally and form its own state.
Such a theory underpins the claim that Quebec is
entitled to decide on its own whether or not to leave
Canada. This paper examines the main philosophical
arguments for the theory and finds them onedimensional and inadequate; they fail to take account
of the full range of complex issues arising in actual
cases of proposed secession. If the right of national
self-determination is understood as involving a right of
unilateral secession, it cannot be attributed to national
groups across the board. It arises only in specific
historical circumstances, usually involving oppression
or other forms of grave injustice.

SLATrERY*

Certains ont dit que le droit d'auto-d6termination
nationale donne &tout groupe national le pouvoir de
d6rider pour lui-meme s'il veut rester Al'int6rieur d'un
6tat qui existe ou s'il veut s~cdder unilat6ralement et
former son propre stat.Une telle th6orie soutient Ia
revendication que le Qu6bec a le droit de d6ecider s'il
veut quitter le Canada ou non. Cette dissertation
examine les arguments philosophiques principaux de
cette thdorie et les trouve unidimensionnels et
insuffisants; ils ne prennent pas en consideration toute
la gamme des questions compliqus qui surviennent
dans les cas actuels de s(cession propos6e. Si, par le
droit d'auto-d6termination nationale, on entend un
droit de s~cession unlatdrale, cc droit ne put pas atre
attribu6 Atout groupe national qui existe. I1ne survient
que dans des circonstances historiques spcifiques qui
comprennent d'habitude de l'oppression ou d'autres
formes de grave injustice.

Freedom and not servitude is the cure of anarchy; as religion, and not atheism, is the true
remedy for superstition.
-Edmund Burke, Speech on Conciliation with America, 1775
The only liberty I mean, is a liberty connected with order;, that not only exists along with
order and virtue, but which cannot exist at all without them.
-Ednund

Burke, Speech at his arrival at Bristol, 1774
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I. INTRODUCTION

Many years ago, while visiting the city of Ottawa for the
weekend, I happened across a parade making its way down a major
thoroughfare, with bands, majorettes, and columns of marchers bearing
embroidered standards and banners. It was a rather modest parade, as
parades go. But in the warm summer sunshine, it had attracted a fair
number of spectators, who lined the sidewalks to watch and applaud. I
stopped for a while and was struck by the fact that some of the marchers
seemed a little down on their luck, a little grim about the mouth. And
then I began scrutinizing more carefully the standards that they carried.
Some of them bore inscriptions like: ONE QUEEN, ONE COUNTRY, ONE
FArm, ONE LANGUAGE. It suddenly dawned on me that this was a
parade of the Orange Order, the intolerant "English first" society born
in Ireland during the late 1700s. I was startled, but also intrigued. As a
native of Montreal, I had never before witnessed such a parade. For me,
Orangemen were a feature of distant disputes in Northern Ireland or
perhaps nineteenth-century Ontario-certainly not a part of the
contemporary political scene in Canada. And then I noticed another
remarkable fact. Most of the spectators around me happened to be
francophone who, caught up in the spirit of the occasion, were cheerfully
applauding the efforts of the bands and commenting to one another in
French on the costumes and floats. Perhaps they were not paying much
attention to the inscriptions on the standards. Or perhaps, like good
Canadians, they were just being polite.
Since that time a number of things have changed in Canada. For
one, I am not sure that Orange parades are still being held in Ottawa.
Perhaps they have finally found their way to the burial grounds of
political white elephants. But observing the drift of events in
anglophone Canada over the past decade, I occasionally imagine that I
am watching an updated version of the same parade. Only now the
wording on the banners is a little different. It still reads: ONE CoUNTRY

and ONE

LANGUAGE.

However, ONE

QUEEN

is now in much smaller
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letters, and
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ONE REuGION

has become

ONE CHARTER OF RiGHTs AND

FREEDOMS.

In my imagined scenario there is another important difference.
Many of the francophone spectators are no longer there, turning a blind
eye to offensive slogans. Alienated, or just plain bored, they have moved
on to other things. And, not unexpectedly, some of them have been
attracted to other parades, where the banners are emblazoned with
similar inscriptions, reading ONE CouNTRY, ONE IANGUAGE, and so on.
The difference, of course, is that the country they have in mind is not
Canada, but Quebec.
To many Canadians of all backgrounds, both sorts of parades
must seem strange and disheartening spectacles. For they represent a
species of political fundamentalism that seems untrue to our history and
shared political morality. For one thing, a lot of people are left out of
both parades. In the end, I do not think that most thoughtful Canadians,
whether anglophone or francophone, subscribe to the exclusivist slogans
on either set of the banners, except in moments of frustration and
forgetfulness. So these parades are not representative of our best and
most profound feelings although, like parades everywhere, they attract a
lot of attention.
Moreover, the parades tend to shut out an important sector of
our population-the indigenous peoples. They are neither English nor
French in their origins and cultural identities. Neither are they new
immigrants, who might perhaps be expected to adapt eventually to either
linguistic community. They are Canada's original peoples, whose timelines on this continent so greatly exceed those of incoming groups as to
dwarf them completely. Aboriginal peoples were once the sole stewards
of the land that they now share with other Canadians. And they are not
even invited to the parades, except perhaps to provide a little local
colour.
Another point comes to mind. The simple slogans on the
banners fly in the face of the complex realities of Canadian history,
which speak of continuous (if often difficult) accommodations among
different national groups, of long-standing inter-societal commitments
and responsibilities, of bargains and compromises, of being bound
together by a multitude of common interests, common undertakings,
common memories, common sentiments, even common terms of
disagreement. Canadians of all backgrounds have travelled a long way
together during the past several centuries and, through hard experience,
have learned something (although perhaps not enough) about
accommodating a variety of national cultures and languages within a
flexible federal framework. The incongruous juxtaposition of peoples
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and attitudes at that Ottawa parade and the fund of good humour and
tolerance among the spectators, so far removed in spirit from the
bristling slogans on the banners, were perhaps not so atypical of our
political culture after all.
I think about these sorts of things when I reflect on the right of
national self-determination-the subject of our inquiry here. As
commonly understood, this right gives certain national groups the power
to decide whether or not to secede from the states they belong to.
Although I appreciate the force of the abstract arguments favouring such
a right, when I consider these arguments in a concrete context (such as
that of Canada and Quebec) they often seem too simple and schematic
to cope with the complex web of reciprocal rights, commitments, and
responsibilities that history and human interaction have conspired to
weave. In other words, in concrete situations the attractive simplicity of
the theory seems to dissolve into a sea of contradiction and paradox. It
is this sense of paradox that I would like to convey here.
But first, a few clarifications. When speaking of the right of selfdetermination in its most general sense, I mean the power of a group to
determine its own international status-whether to become, remain, or
cease to be an independent state. According to this definition, both
existing states and sub-state groups are capable of holding a right of selfdetermination. In this paper, however, we are concerned only with a
branch of this topic, what may be called the right of national selfdetermination. This is the right of a national group contained within a
state to decide whether or not to secede from that state and form its own
state. So, in our terminology, the right of national self-determination is
a subdivision of the general right of self-determination. Let me highlight
some features of this approach.
First, I assume that the general right of self-determination refers
in its most obvious sense to the right of independent states to determine
their status freely under international law.1 While the right of selfdetermination may also extend to certain sub-state groups that aspire to
full international statehood (as in the case of national selfdetermination), such groups only claim for themselves the right that
independent states already possess. By contrast, there is a tendency in
the literature to use the term "self-determination" as if it referred
exclusively to a right held by sub-state entities. The tendency is a natural
one, given that the latter entities present most of the difficult questions
and attract the most attention. However, the larger meaning of the term
I Compare 3. Crawford, The Creation ofStates in InternationalLaw (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1979) at 84-102.
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is worth keeping in mind, as it has a certain bearing on our subject.
Second, according to the theory considered here, the right of
national self-determination is unilateral in nature-it can be exercised
without the consent of any other group, whether that be an existing state
or a sub-state group. However, we should remember that the right of
national self-determination can also be couched in more moderate
terms. According to one view, for example, the right is normally
"interdependent" or "mutual" rather than unilateral and requires the
participation and consent of other groups whose vital interests are at
stake. While this paper does not discuss such viewpoints directly, it may
help to clear the way for their consideration. For our present limited
purposes, where a national group holds a right of self-determination, it
can exercise it without the consent of other groups and over their
objections.
Third, the term "national group" is used here in a somewhat
narrow and specialized sense. It refers to any sub-state group that feels
strong and pervasive bonds of culture, language, religion, or historical
origins (and often a combination of these), and that constitutes a
substantial majority of the population in a territory forming part of one
or more existing states. It can be seen that this definition excludes
groups that are dispersed amidst a larger population and do not form a
substantial majority in any territory. Whether such a dispersed group
might, in certain circumstances, have the right to acquire a territorial
base of its own is a difficult question that cannot be considered here.
Fourth, national self-determination involves a decision whether
or not to gain full independence. In some discussions, the term is used
in a broader sense to include decisions to gain a measure of regional
autonomy, short of independence. However, that subject raises a range
of distinct issues, which require separate treatment. So, for the sake of
clarity, we will distinguish here between the right of national selfdetermination proper and what might be described as a "right of
national autonomy." Only the former subject will be addressed in this
paper; however, our discussion will also have some indirect implications
for the latter.2
Finally, we will focus on some basic questions of principle that
arise when national groups advance claims of self-determination. That
is, the inquiry is broadly moral and jurisprudential in nature rather than
strictly legal. I will not attempt the difficult and controversial task of
ascertaining how far international law currently attributes rights of self2 See, for example, the valuable discussion in S. J. Anaya, "The Capacity of International Law
to Advance Ethnic or Nationality Rights Claims" (1990) 75 Iowa LR. 837.
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determination to national groups. However, the latter question is deeply
rooted in fundamental considerations of justice and morality, so our
inquiry may help to shed some light on its resolution.
II. FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY
We begin with a pair of contrasting viewpoints. The first is
voiced in an article written by William Dunning some seventy years ago
on the topic of liberty and equality in international relations:
The importance of liberty in the scheme of human social existence has been greatly
exaggerated in modem political science. With equality as the characteristic attribute of
liberty, social existence becomes inconceivable. Authority is what makes any form of
human society possible. It is as indispensable to a society of peoples as it is to a society of
individuals. It is incompatible with absolute equality and with absolute liberty; but it is an
indispensable guaranty of proportional equality and of qualified and practicable liberty.
No aggregate of individuals or of peoples has ever existed or ever can exist without some
institutional expression of the relation of ruler and ruled. Recent political science has
tended to lose sight of this fact and to centre its attention on the units that make up the
political group rather than the group as a whole. The doctrine that is needed to explain
and to guide the international relations of the twentieth, or for that matter any other,
century must rest on these dogmas: Peoples, like individuals, are not by nature free;
peoples, like individuals, are not by nature equal. Authority is prior to liberty and makes
3
liberty possible. Self-determination for peoples is what anarchy is for individuals.

To contemporary sensibilities, this passage seems a trifle
conservative in tone and content. Why, we may ask, should authority be
given such priority over liberty? When appraised from a vantage point
at the close of the twentieth century, the credentials of authority may
seem somewhat tarnished. They bring to mind the claims of the French
government in Algeria, of the British in India and Kenya, of Portugal in
Mozambique, of the Soviet Union in Lithuania, of the Chinese in Tibet.
Appeals to authority, in this context, have served all too often as screens
for national or racial oppression.
More attuned to the contemporary spirit, perhaps, is an
approach that takes freedom as its central theme. As framed by Allen
Buchanan in a recent study of secession, this "liberal" argument runs as
follows:
If we begin with a general presumption in favor of liberty, it seems to carry with it a
presumption in favor of a right to secede. Even the most fervent advocates of liberty
admit, however, that it must respect limits. The Harm Principle has been proposed to

3 W.A. Dunning, "Liberty and Equality in International Relations" (1923) 17 Am. Pol. Sci.
Rev. 1 at 15-16. 'This paper was the Presidential Address to the annual meeting of the American
Political Science Association in 1922.
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specify the proper limits of liberty. According to the Harm Principle, it is impermissible
to interfere with an individual so long as her choice does not harm others. But if it is
impermissible to interfere with the liberty of an individual so long as her choice does not
harm others, then it seems impermissible also to interfere with a group of individuals'
4
efforts to secede, if these efforts do not harm others.

According to this view, the fundamental value of liberty
presumptively supports a group right of secession, subject to limits
flowing from the harm principle. Buchanan develops this point in the
following passage:
The case for secession based on the presumption of liberty can be elaborated and
deepened, at least if a liberal point of view is granted. A liberal values the freedom of
individuals and groups and seeks to safeguard it by according priority to certain basic
legal rights of the sort found, say, in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of Rights or in Rawls'
Principle of Greatest Equal Liberty. ... Upholding these rights allows many different
sorts of communities to coexist peacefully within the liberal framework. But what if there
remain some forms of social life that cannot flourish there, or what if the members of
some communities simply do not wish to remain within the liberal state? Should they not
be allowed to free themselves of the political authority of the liberal state if they wish to
do so (at least so long as their doing so harms no one else in the relevant sense)? Seen in
this way, the right to secede is the logical extension of a principle of toleration thought to
be central to the liberal point of view.5

When we compare the contrasting approaches of these two
authors, we might be led to believe that the basic issue separating them
is the relative weight to be assigned to authority and liberty, with
Dunning favouring the former and Buchanan the latter. However, this
contrast does not survive closer examination. In the context of national
self-determination, what appears at first to be a simple claim of liberty
turns out to harbour a claim of authority in disguise. The reason is
simple: to assert the presumptive liberty of a group to secede from a
state is to assert the group's authority to determine the basic political
status of its members and to govern them, even against the wishes of
some of them. The claim of a secessionist group against the state is in
fact a competing claim to ultimate governmental authority.
Consider, for example, the case of Quebec. According to the
liberal argument, there is a presumption favouring the liberty of Quebec
to separate from Canada, subject to any limits flowing from the harm
principle. Whether or not this argument is correct, it must in practice
stand for the view that the people of Quebec presumptively have the
4 A. Buchanan, Secession: The Mortality of PoliticalDivorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuaniaand
Quebec (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1991) at 29. It should be noted that while Buchanan
seems to favour the argument, he does not clearly indicate what ultimate weight it carries in his
overall scheme.
5

Ibid. at 30-31 [footnotes omitted].
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collective right to override the wishes of dissenting individuals and
groups within Quebec and to oust the authority of Canada in favour of
that of an independent state. Even if a high margin of popular approval
is required, such as a two-thirds majority in a referendum, the argument
must envisage the ability of Quebec to separate with less than the
unanimous consent of the populace. To require unanimity would be to
pose a standard that could hardly ever be met.
Suppose, for example, that a separatist government in Quebec
holds a referendum asking in effect whether the Province should declare
independence from Canada, and roughly two-thirds of those voting reply
in the affirmative. Let us also assume that this margin represents more
than one-half of the entire pool of adult citizens, both voting and nonvoting. By most standards, this would represent a high level of popular
support for separation. On this basis, the Quebec government sets a
date for independence and proposes to open negotiations with the
Canadian government to ensure a smooth transition. It seems clear that
the Quebec government's assertion of the right to secede from Canada
entails a claim to speak and act authoritatively in this matter on behalf of
all Quebec residents, including the large bloc of people (one-third of all
voters) that actively dissented. It also involves a broader claim to hold
ultimate governmental authority over the territory of Quebec and all its
residents, even if implementation of this claim is postponed pending
negotiations.
Suppose, however, that a very high margin of Aboriginal voters
in Quebec (say eighty percent) cast their ballots against independence.
Native peoples have always formed distinct social and political groups in
the Province, with their own languages, cultures, territories, and special
constitutional status. In certain parts of Quebec, they form a strong
majority of the population. When the Confederation of Canada was
formed in 1867, the Constitution assigned the subject-matter "Indians,
and Lands reserved for the Indians" to the Federal Parliament.6 And in
1982, the Aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples were
explicitly entrenched. 7 So, under our scenario, questions would arise as
to the legitimacy of a separatist government's claim to ultimate authority
over Aboriginal peoples and their territories. That claim would not rest
on the consent of those peoples, since they voted strongly against
independence in our hypothetical referendum. What then would it be
6 ConsatutionAc, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, s. 91(24).
7Section 35(1) of the ConslitutionAct,1982, being Schedule B to the CanadaAct1982 (U.K.),
1982, c. 11 provides: "[t]he existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada
are hereby recognized and affirmed."
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based on? Would it find support in the particular history of Quebec, its
territories, population, and government? Or would it invoke principled
arguments concerning the legitimacy of majority rule?
Whatever answers we give to these questions, we have clearly
drifted into troubled waters. What seemed at first a relatively
straightforward claim of national self-determination turns out to involve
an assertion of governmental authority over dissenting individuals and
groups, authority whose legitimacy may be open to challenges For,
unlike the Canadian state, the aspiring state of Quebec would not
possess the advantage of long-standing and peaceable existence, and so
could not wrap itself in the cloak of established custom and practice.
Neither, on the other hand, could it claim to be grounded in the consent
of all the peoples concerned, a fact that at first blush seems at odds with
a full-blooded notion of self-determination.
However, it could be argued that the existence of dissident
groups within Quebec would not necessarily undercut the consensual
claims of a separatist government. Such a government would likely give
residents the option of moving elsewhere in Canada, and the Canadian
government would probably feel obliged to go along with such a plan.
So long as the Quebec government offered this option, it arguably would
not be claiming the authority to rule dissenters without their consent.
Rather, those that object to independence could leave of their own free
will, while those that remain would tacitly accept the new arrangements.
Now it is true that a resettlement scheme would broaden the
options available to Quebec residents who are troubled by the prospect
of separation. As such, it would soften the impact of separation on
certain individuals, particularly those who are young and mobile.
However, it does not seem plausible to argue that dissenters that remain
in Quebec necessarily consent, even tacitly, to the new government's
authority. Consider again the position of Aboriginal peoples. Under a
resettlement scheme, they would be afforded the choice of staying in
8 As Buchanan, supranote 4 at 78, aptly remarks:
[To the extent that the exercise of a group right entails a political structure within the
group (i.e. a structure consisting of leaders or representatives, or other official bodies),
group rights encourage hierarchy and create the possibility of opposition between the
interests of those who control the exercise of the right and the interests of other members
of the group. ... [Further] some individual or subset of the group has the ultimate say as
to whether to exercise the right. Even if others decide on the basis of a sincere

commitment to doing what is best for that individual or subgroup, they are the ones who
are in control.
See also his comments on minority group rights at 39-40 and 57-58.
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Quebec or else abandoning their ancestral homelands for an uncertain
future elsewhere in Canada. For most Aboriginal peoples, this would be
no real choice at all. To say that those who continue to live in their
traditional territories actually consent to the authority of the new
government rather stretches the point. In reality, secession would alter
the status of Aboriginal peoples and their territories without their
consent.
Nevertheless, a second, more powerful argument might be given
in reply. This argument maintains that, just as Quebec has the
presumptive liberty to secede from Canada, so also dissenting groups,
such as Aboriginal peoples, are equally at liberty to break away from a
secessionist Quebec and attach themselves to Canada or else establish
their own independent states. While this approach should be given full
marks for logical consistency, it does not escape from the difficulty we
have been considering. While the majority of an Aboriginal group might
support separating from Quebec, a minority would likely dissent from
this view. And so the fundamental question again arises: what authority
does a local majority have to alter the political status of a dissenting
minority?
In short, what we see here is not so much a contest between the
claims of liberty and authority, on the model of an individual standing
against the state, as a contest between two rival claims of authority,
advanced respectively by an existing political unit and an aspiring new
polity. This point does not, of course, speak to the relative merits of
these opposing claims; it simply shows that they have a similar moral
structure. Both the original state and a secessionist government assert
the ultimate authority to represent and govern a certain group of people,
includingany dissenters.
The same point may be made in a slightly different way. In
practice, the liberal principle that favours the liberty of the individual
operates within the context of civil society. As such, it tacitly assumes
the existence of certain basic bonds among the citizens. These bonds
provide the foundation for governmental structures and bolster the
claims of the state to the allegiance of its members. Liberalism has, with
some success, drawn attention to the need to limit the power of
government to interfere with the freedom of citizens. It aims to shape
the society's public morality and to set limits on the coercive powers of
its institutions. However, liberalism has been less successful in
explaining the nature and origins of the bonds to which those institutions
owe their existence. Classical liberal arguments from contract and
consent, as advanced by Locke and others, are subject to well-known
difficulties. Faced with the daunting task of showing that individual

1994]

Paradoxesof National Self-Determination

713

citizens have actually consented to the exercise of governmental
authority, these arguments usually resort to the concept of "tacit"
consent which, however ingeniously developed, barely serves to disguise
an effort to shore up the status quo.
Even if this obstacle can be overcome, liberal thinkers have to
show that an individual's consent to the authority of the state is generally
binding, that consent cannot be withdrawn at the individual's pleasure.
Of course, it is possible to invoke a principle under which certain
expressions of consent are taken to bind the person making them, at
least in the absence of unusual circumstances-a variant on the ancient
maxim, pacta sunt servanda. But the legitimacy of this principle cannot
itself depend on consent; otherwise, we are led into circularity. Rather,
the principle seems to operate as a fundamental norm of justice, which
takes us well beyond the framework of consensual liberalism and points
in the direction of natural law.
Underlying the debate about the legitimacy of secession, then, is
a more fundamental-yet largely suppressed-debate about the
legitimacy of authority. In brief, it could be said that secession from a
state is justified if and only if, for one reason or another, the authority of
the state over a seceding group is not legitimate, or at the least is
significantly less legitimate than the authority of the aspiring secessionist
government. But when is authority legitimate? To the extent that
liberalism has failed to provide a coherent and persuasive answer to this
question, it cannot help us resolve the debate over secession.
A further point can be made. As ordinarily understood, the
liberal principle does not support the right of particular individuals to
withdraw themselves and the territoriesthey occupy from the civil society
to which they belong. For example, liberalism is not generally
understood as favouring an individual's right to set up an independent
enclave in the heart of Montreal or even on a small island in a northern
lake. At the very least, strong arguments would have to be supplied to
show how liberalism supports such surprising claims. So, even if we
assume that the move from the individual to the group is legitimate in
this context, the principle favouring individual liberty would at most
recognize the right of a group to act freely within the territorialframework
of the civil society to which it belongs. It would not support a group's right
to secede, taking with it the territories it occupies.
So, when a group asserts that it is entitled to secede from an
existing state, this claim tacitly involves a claim of territorial title and not
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just a claim of political autonomy? At a minimum, it entails a claim that
the seceding group has a better title to the contested territory than the
original state or any other group of citizens. In this respect, then, the
right of secession differs from the right of groups to emigrate freely from
a country. The right of emigration does not threaten the territorial
integrity of the original state or present a rival territorial claim.
So, for example, an assertion by Quebec of the right to separate
from Canada necessarily entails the claim that it has international title to
the whole of the territory presently comprised in the Province. That title
must presumably be superior to the international title currently held by
Canada; otherwise Canada would have the right to block the secession.
The asserted title must also be superior to territorial claims that might
be advanced by other groups, such as Aboriginal peoples. It can be seen
that the issues raised by this point involve complex historical
considerations, the resolution of which is far from self-evident.
The position of Northern Quebec poses particular difficulties. In
1912, this area was transferred to the Province from the Northwest
Territories, where it had been under exclusive Federal jurisdiction. The
effect of this transfer was to establish a territorial and jurisdictional
condominium. On the territorial side, Quebec gained a beneficial
interest in the soil, subject to Aboriginal title and other existing interests;
neverthless, the international territorial title remained with Canada. On
the jurisdictional side, the transfer inaugurated a regime of joint
authority, characterized by a constitutionally-entrenched division of
powers between the federal and provincial governments, arguably in
tandem with inherent Aboriginal powers of self-government.' o These
new arrangements represented a significant departure from the former
regime, under which the federal Crown had possessed full legislative
jurisdiction and territorial rights in the region, subject to Aboriginal
jurisdiction and title.
Nevertheless, a tacit premise of the transfer was that

9 See discussion in L. Brilmayer "Secession and Self-Determination: A Territorial
Interpretation" (1991) 16 Yale J. Int'l. L. 177, and Buchanan, supranote 4 at 9-11, 32, and 60-64.
10 On the latter point see, for example, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Partnersin
Confederation:Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government, and the Constitution (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services Canada, 1993); J.J. Borrows, "A Genealogy of Law: Inherent Sovereignty and
First Nations Self-Government" (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall LJ.291; P. Macklein, "First Nations SelfGovernment and the Borders of the Canadian Legal Imagination" (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382; S.
Nakatsurut "A Constitutional Right of Indian Self-Government" (1985) 43 U. T. Fac. L. Rev. 72; B.
Ryder, "The Demise and Rise of the Classical Paradigm in Canadian Federalism: Promoting
Autonomy for the Provinces and First Nations" (1991) 36 McGill LJ. 308; and B. Slattexy, "First
Nations and the Constitution A Question of Trust" (1992) 71 Can. Bar Rev. 261.
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international title to the region would remain with the Canadian state,
and that jurisdiction over certain aspects of the region's affairs would
continue to be held by the Federal government under the standard
division of powers laid down in the Constitution. In particular,
jurisdiction with respect to Aboriginal peoples and their lands would rest
with the Canadian Parliament. More recently, the matter has been
complicated by the conclusion of a land claims agreement with the
Aboriginal peoples of the region, which recognizes a range of rights
inhering in those peoples in exchange for a surrender of their Aboriginal
title. 11 Given this complex historical background, the multiple
dimensions of which are only suggested here, it is far from evident which
party would in principle have the better claim to Northern Quebec in the
event of secession--Canada, Quebec, or indeed the Aboriginal peoples.
It can be seen how far removed we are from a simple assertion of liberty
under a model of individual rights.
There is yet another reason why the liberal-based analogy
between individuals and groups is misleading in this context. Individuals
are distinct spiritual and biological entities, whose autonomy and
internal coherence are, for the most part, not in doubt. The same can
hardly be said of groups, where questions of membership, identity,
allegiance, and legitimacy are endemic. So, while it is often convenient
to talk about groups as if they were individuals, this habit can be deeply
misleading. In the case at hand, it can lull us into assuming that groups
have the same natural and self-evident identity as individuals, forgetting
just how problematic the question of group identity can be.
In reality, once we probe beyond the abstract references to
"groups," we find historical processes at work. Groups do not come
ready-formed; they are the result of complex social, cultural, religious,
and political transformations extending over long periods of time. There
is no way of identifying in advance the precise factors that will
predominate in the formation of group allegiances. Is commonality of
language more important than commonality of religion, culture, politics,
or ethnicity? Different answers have been given in different times and
places. The situation in contemporary Canada, for example, where
language and culture are usually more significant to group allegiances
than religion, is very different from that prevailing in the nineteenth

11

The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (Quebec: tditeur officiel du Quebec,

1976), as enacted in S.C. 1976-77, c. 32, and S.Q. 1976, c. 46. For discussion, see, for example, W.
Moss, "The Implementation of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement" in B.W. Morse,
ed., Aboriginal Peoples and the Law: Indian, MWtis and Iuit Rights in Canada (Ottawa: Carleton
University Press, 1985) at 684.
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century, when religious affiliation still played a prominent role.
Underlying any assertion of a right of national selfdetermination, then, is an assertion of group legitimacy. That is, the
group tacitly maintains that it is an appropriate unit for purposes of
exercising the right. Not only that, it must assert in effect that it is more
appropriate than the unit composing the existing state and also more
suitable than any rival groups that might wish to assert equivalent rights.
The liberal analogy between individual rights and group rights tends to
paper over these fundamental issues.
We have seen, then, that the right of national self-determination
differs in at least three important respects from an individual claim of
liberty. First, the right of national self-determination potentially
involves not only a claim of liberty against the existing state, but also' a
claim of authority with respect to the residents of the seceding territory,
namely, the authority to decide their international status and ultimately
to govern them to the exclusion of other states. This claim extends to
any dissenting residents and competes with the similar claim of authority
advanced by the existing state. Second, unlike an individual liberty
claim, the right of national self-determination potentially involves a
territorial claim. A secessionist national group necessarily asserts that it
has international title to the territory concerned, a title that is superior
to that of the existing state. Finally, the liberal approach assumes that
national groups have the same natural and self-evident identity as
individual human beings. It does not acknowledge the extent to which
identities of national groups are problematic, often involving complex
issues of allegiance.
So, a claim of national self-determination is a far cry from a
simple claim of liberty on the model of individual rights. It is a rather
more tangled affair, one that raises some of the most puzzling questions
of political and legal theory-to wit, the three basic issues of authority,
territorial title, and group allegiance. Perhaps, however, these questions
can be handled by a different approach, one that moves beyond the
framework of liberalism and frankly acknowledges the communal nature
of a claim of national self-determination. This is the subject of the next
section.
III. THE VALUE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT
A sophisticated version of the communal approach to selfdetermination is presented in a recent paper by Avishai Margalit and
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Joseph Raz.j 2 In a nutshell, the authors argue that the right of national
self-determination finds its moral grounding in the value that selfgovernment has for certain kinds of communities, whose prosperity is
central to the welfare of their individual members. While this argument,
as we will see, does not seem strong enough to support a general right of
national self-determination, it serves the purpose of clarifying the basic
issues at stake and showing how deeply problematic the subject is.
Margalit and Raz maintain that the self-identity and well-being
of many individuals are grounded in their membership in groups. The
significance of such communal ties varies greatly. Membership in
voluntary organizations such as sports clubs or charitable groups may be
enriching and worthwhile, but generally is not fundamental to a person's
life. By contrast, membership in certain ethnic, cultural, or religious
groups is often central to an individual's sense of self-identity and wellbeing. Such groups are generally distinguished by the fact that they have
rich, multifaceted cultures, which are transmitted down the generations
and affect many important aspects of people's lives. In the authors'
terminology, a group that plays this central role in the lives of its
members is an "encompassing group." The authors observe:
The way things are in our world, just about everyone belongs to such a group, and not
necessarily to one only. Membership is not exclusive and many people belong to several

groups that answer to our description. Some of them are rather like national groups, e.g,
tribes or ethnic groups. Others are very different. Some religious groups meet our
conditions, as do social classes, and some racial groups. Not all religions or racial groups
did develop rich and pervasive cultures. But some did and those qualify. 13

This description of an "encompassing group" comes close to the concept
of a "national group" developed at the start of the paper, and so we will
use the two terms interchangeably.
The importance of encompassing groups to the lives of their
members means that there is a strong, if indirect, link between
communal prosperity and individual well-being. To lack membership in
a pervasive culture is often to experience serious limitations on one's
opportunities and abilities. Moreover, where the group's culture suffers
from decay or repression, the options and opportunities available to its
members may correspondingly shrink and their dignity and self-respect
may be adversely affected.
This link between individual and communal well-being lies at the
heart of the authors' case. In their view, any group that qualifies as an
12

"National Self-Determination" (1990) 87 . Phil. 439.

13 Ibid at 447.
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encompassing group has the right to determine the status of a territory
where it constitutes a substantial majority of the population. 4 In
particular, such a group is entitled to decide whether the territory should
form an independent state. That is, it possesses a right of selfdetermination.
The authors back up this thesis in the following way. The right
of self-determination, they say, is justified by the broader value of selfgovernment, which is the value of entrusting a group with general
political power over its own affairs.15 This distinction between the
concepts of self-determination and self-government is central to the
authors' analysis and bears closer examination.
In their terminology, the right of self-determination is an exclusive
power to determine the international legal status of a certain territory; in
particular, it is the power to decide whether the territory should become
or remain an independent state.1 6 By contrast, in its core sense, selfgovernment involves the substantive right of a group actually to govern
itself as an independent state with its own territories; in a word, it entails
political sovereignty. 7 As the authors remark, self-government speaks
of "groups determining the character of their social and economic
environment, their fortunes, the course of their development, and the
fortunes of their members by their own actions ...
.,18 The value of selfgovernment is the good that would flow from the exercise of such a right.
In assessing that value, one must have regard not only to the group itself,
but also to any others that might be affected 9
So, according to this approach, the right of self-determination is
a power of "self-adjudication," which allows encompassing groups to
decide on their own future, rather than the substantive right of self-

14]bid. at 457. The authors later speak of "the vast majority of the population in the relevant
territory" (at 461), which perhaps suggests a somewhat higher standard than a "substantial
majority."
15
bi&. at 440-41. The authors initially use the term "national self-government," but later
abandon this for the simpler term "self-government" (at 447 ff.). Since nothing seems to turn on
the matter, the simpler term is used here.
16
Ibid. at 440. The authors mention that the decision whether a territory should enjoy
autonomy within a larger state may possibly also fall within the right of self-determination.
However, they conclude that, given the current international state system, independence is naturally
regarded as the main way of realizing the ideal of self-determination; so their discussion centres on
the latter possibility (at 440-41).
17
1bid at 440-41 and 450.
18IbI& at 440.
19mbj

at 454-55.
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government as such. Of course, exercising this right might give rise to
the substantive right of independence and self-government, but it need
not necessarily do so. For example, in implementing its right of selfdetermination in a referendum, an encompassing group might reject the
option of independence and decide to remain part of the existing state.
Note, however, that the right of self-determination is apparently not a
single-shot affair but one open to repeated exercise. So a group would
always be free to change its mind on some future occasion.
How, then, does the value of self-government serve to justify a
right of national self-determination? Margalit and Raz present their
argument in two stages. First, they maintain that self-government
potentially holds a special value for encompassing groups. Second, they
hold that this value is substantial enough to give such groups the
exclusive right to determine whether they should constitute independent,
self-governing states.
In addressing the first proposition, the authors consider the
merits of two sorts of arguments. The most ambitious of the two
maintains that self-government is intrinsically valuable to the members
of encompassing groups, as an end in itself; the second argument holds,
more modestly, that self-government is justified instrumentally, as a
means to other desirable ends.
According to the first argument, people's membership in an
encompassing group is a significant aspect of their personalities and as
such requires full expression in the public life of a community. Such
expression must include the opportunity to carry on political activities in
the name of the group as an important avenue for self-fulfilment.
However, full political expression cannot be achieved in the absence of
self-government. Without the possibilities afforded by independent
statehood, the opportunities for political self-expression are limited. In
sum, self-government is inherently valuable, since it is needed to provide
the group with a political dimension and to allow for individual selffulfilment in political action.20
The authors do not find this argument convincing. They point
out that not everyone has to participate in politics in order to achieve
personal well-being. In normal circumstances, politics is but one option
among many for finding self-fulfilment in the social sphere. True, the
opportunity to fight for political causes associated with one's
encompassing group must remain open, and such political activity may
have instrinsic value for those who engage in it. But there is no reason
why political activity has to be carried on within a constitutional
20

IbiL at 451-52.
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framework exclusive to one's group or dominated by it. As the authors
justly observe, "[t]here is nothing wrong with multinational states, in
which members of the different communities compete in the political
arena for public resources for their communities." 21
Despite the failure of the first argument, the authors consider
that a strong instrumental case can be made for self-government. This
second line of argument holds that in certain situations the well-being of
an encompassing group requires that it have the right to govern itself,
since group members are generally better positioned than outsiders to
make decisions on matters affecting the group's own welfare. Sovereign
independence enables a group to conduct its own affairs in a way
conducive to its prosperity. The authors acknowledge that, in reality,
groups do not always prosper upon the achievement of statehood. In
fact, sometimes independence may usher in a period of cultural, social,
or economic decline. So, the case for self-government is an instrumental
one, which varies according to the particular circumstances and is
sensitive to counterarguments pointing out the potential drawbacks of
independence. Self-government is not intrinsically valuable for
2
encompassing groups; its value depends on the historical context. 2
Nevertheless, in the authors' judgment, the potential value of
self-government for an encompassing group is substantial enough to give
the group the exclusive right to decide whether the circumstances
justifying self-government are present. It is for such a group to
determine whether, given the particular historical context, its territory
should form an independent, self-governing state. This right is subject to
several provisos.2 It must be exercised for the right reasons, namely, to
advance communal well-being and self-respect, rather than, for example,
to secure exclusive control over valuable natural resources. Further, the
new state must respect the fundamental human rights of all its
inhabitants. And finally, measures must be taken to avoid damaging the
just interests of other countries. Subject to these qualifications, an
encompassing group possesses a right of self-determination. We have
arrived, then, at the final destination of the argument.
But why should encompassing groups have this far-reaching
right? The authors explain:
In our world, encompassing groups that do not enjoy self-government are not
infrequently persecuted, despised, or neglected. Given the importance of their prosperity

21

bU at 453.

22

bid.at 450-53.

23

bI.

at 457 and 459-60.
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and self-respect to the well-being of their members, it seems reasonable to entrust their
members with the right to determine whether the groups should be self-governing. They

may sacrifice their economic or other interests for the sake of group self-respect and
prosperity. But such a sacrifice is, given the circumstances of this world, often not
unreasonablei 24

From this conclusion there follows a strong corollary. Since
encompassing groups have the exclusive right to determine their own
political future, they can in practice exercise that right in either a wise or
a foolish fashion. Thus they can opt for independence even if, in the
judgment of a detached observer, the circumstances warranting selfgovernment are lacking. As the authors observe:
A group's right to self-determination is its right to determine that a territory be self-

governing, regardless of whether the case for self-government, based on its benefits, is
established or not. In other words, the right to self-determination answers the question
'who is to decide?,' not 'what is the best decision?.' In exercising the right, the group

should act responsibly in light of all the considerations we mentioned so far. It should, in
particular, consider not only the interests of its members but those of others who may be
affected by its decision. But if it has the right to decide, its decision is binding even if it is
wrong, even if the case for self-government is not made. 25

In effect, the right of self-determination makes encompassing
groups judges in their own cause. The authors agree that it would be
preferable if an international tribunal could be entrusted with making
decisions about these questions. However, they consider it unlikely that
adequate international machinery will be available for this task in the
near future. So, in their view, a right of self-adjudication is the only
practical alternative. 26
How should the right be exercised? According to the authors, a
simple majority vote is not sufficient. Given the long-term implications
of the decision and the difficulty in reversing it, the desire for an
independent state must be shared by the overwhelming majority of the
group. The authors remark that the precise manner in which the
decision is made will vary with the circumstances of particular national
and ethnic groups 2 7 They seem to assume, nevertheless, that in
Western-style democracies the decision would ordinarily be made by
referendum.
This, then, is the basic structure of the "communal" theory, as
framed by Margalit and Raz. What can we say about its merits? Clearly,
24

kid. at 457.

25 Ibida at 454.
26

1bid. at 457-58.

27

1bid. at 458.
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the argument represents a significant advance over the liberal argument
considered at the start. In particular, it acknowledges the special
character of a claim for group freedom, which distinguishes it from a
claim for individual autonomy. The close link between group
membership and individual self-identity is emphasized, as is the
relationship between collective and individual welfare. However, despite
these advantages, the communal theory has difficulties of its own. Not
surprisingly, these relate to the three basic issues identified earlierauthority, territorial title, and allegiance. We will consider each one in
turn.
A. Authority
The communal theory attributes to an encompassing group a farreaching authority, which enables it to determine unilaterally the
international status of the territory it occupies as a majority population
and, at the same time, the future make-up of the state it currently
belongs to. This authority holds good against all the residents of the
territory in question and also, more generally, against the citizenry of the
larger state. What justifies this authority? According to Margalit and
Raz, the right of national self-determination is grounded squarely in
principled considerations that give effect to the value that selfgovernment holds for encompassing groups and their members? 8 As
they state in a crucial passage:
The right to self-determination derives from the value of membership in encompassing
groups. ... It rests on an appreciation of the great importance that membership in and
identification with encompassing groups has in the life ofindividuals, and the importance
of the prosperity and self-respect of such groups to the well-being of their members. That
importance makes it reasonable to let the encompassing group that forms a substantial
majority in a territory have the right to determine whether that territory shall form an
independent state in order to protect the culture and self-respect of the group ... .29

So, the whole argument hinges on the importance that
membership in encompassing groups holds for the individuals
concerned. This factor is so important, the authors suggest, that it
justifies awarding the group the unilateral right to determine the future
of the territory in question, even as against the rights and interests of the
existing state and its population. At first blush, the reasoning seems
somewhat curious. If generalized, it might suggest that the party with
28

lba at 456-57.

29

mbia
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the greatest potential stake in the outcome of a dispute should have the
right to rule on its merits. Were this generally the case, international
conflicts could be resolved simply by awarding a right of selfadjudication to the state most interested in the end result. To the
contrary, of course, the stronger the interest a party has in a dispute, the
less qualified that party normally is to decide it, because the chance of
bias is correspondingly higher. So, the significance that self-government
potentially holds for encompassing groups does not seem to offer a
convincing argument for making them judges in their own cause; if
anything, it would support an argument to the contrary.
Perhaps, however, what the authors have in mind is not so much
the ideal qualifications of an adjudicator, but the likelihood of a
desirable outcome. On this view, self-government is potentially of such
importance to encompassing groups that the process should be
structured to favour strongly the realization of self-government.
Awarding encompassing groups the authority to judge the merits of their
own cause does just that.
Is this rationale a convincing one? Clearly, much turns on the
value that self-government presumptively holds for encompassing
groups. Here we need to distinguish three different kinds of selfgovernment.
In some contexts, self-government carries the meaning of
"democratic government," in the sense of a government in which
supreme power is vested ultimately in the people and exercised by them
under a free electoral system. Democratic self-government contrasts
with any form of government in which the people cannot participate by
free elections.
Self-government also carries another, more specific meaning. A
country lacks self-government in this second sense when it is ruled by an
imperial power in whose governmental institutions the local inhabitants
do not play a significant role. Self-government is attained when most or
all of the powers of government are transferred to the colony, which
becomes largely or totally autonomous. Note that, in this context, selfgovernment does not necessarily mean democratic government because,
for example, a colony might attain independence under the rule of an
indigenous monarchy.
These two meanings of self-government must be distinguished
from a third, which is the only one relevant in the present context. It
relates to situations in which a national group is not in a position to
dominate the government of the state it belongs to, due to its minority
position or other factors, even though group members enjoy ordinary
rights of citizenship and the country is not subject to imperial rule. In
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such situations, a national group may be said to attain self-government
when the state is restructured or sub-divided so as to allow the group to
achieve political ascendancy. Here self-government means "national
government," in the sense of a government in which the national group
in question plays a dominant role. Note again that a national
government need not be democratic, but may take a variety of shapes.
In invoking the value of "self-government," the communal theory
is using the term in its third sense. That is, the theory is concerned with
situations where an encompassing group is not positioned to control the
government of the state it belongs to, whether these situations be
democratic or non-democratic, colonial or non-colonial. The point is
important to keep in mind, for the arguments in favour of both
democratic government and non-colonial government are quite different
from (and often much stronger than) those favouring national
government. In other words, the communal theory is not entitled to
invoke in its favour the distinctive features of non-democratic and
colonial situations, for the argument extends well beyond those contexts.
We are now better equipped to assess the theory's strength.
Clearly there are circumstances in which it is crucial for encompassing
groups. to achieve national self-government in order to ensure their
survival, let alone their prosperity and self-respect. Cases of ethnic and
religious oppression are, unfortunately, no rarer in our times than in any
other. However, the communal theory is not content to make this
sound, if somewhat limited, point. It attributes a right of selfdetermination to all encompassing groups that lack full national selfgovernment, regardless of their actual circumstances. It is this
universality that gives the theory its distinctive bite. The issue, then, is
not whether a right of national self-determination can be justified on a
selective basis (for it clearly can), but rather whether the right can be
given universal application.
A number of considerations suggest a negative answer. First, the
communal theory takes little account of the wide variety of
circumstances in which national groups find themselves. The situation
of an encompassing group that already enjoys a large measure of
autonomy within a democratic federal state is very different from that of
a group that has experienced long-standing ethnic oppression at the
hands of a dictatorial central government. Beyond the observation,
quoted earlier, that national groups lacking self-government are "not
infrequently persecuted, despised, or neglected, '' 30 the authors provide
little evidence to support the global attribution of a right of national self30

bi&d at 457.
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determination.
Second, the theory does not consider the range of political
options short of independence that might satisfy a national group's need
to advance its welfare while avoiding the risks and disruptions associated
with the breakup of a state. Such measures as regional autonomy or
constitutional protection of communal rights would seem, in many cases,
a more satisfactory way of handling the interests at stake than secession.
The value of national self-government does not seem to justify a right of
self-determination unless these other, less extreme options are shown to
be inadequate.
Finally, in focusing almost exclusively on the welfare of
encompassing groups, the communal theory does not clearly
acknowledge that the prospect of national self-determination calls into
play at least two sets of competing interests: those held by the national
group, and those held by the larger body of citizens making up the
existing state (which, of course, includes the members of the national
group in another capacity). To establish a universal right of national
self-determination, it is not enough to show that self-government is
valuable for national groups in some or even many cases. It is necessary
to show that, at a global level, this interest substantially outweighs the
interests of citizens in maintaining existing states intact.
However, such a case is not easy to make on a universal basis.
There is good reason to think that, in a world of serious periodic
disorder, stable boundaries often carry substantial benefits for citizens,
as frameworks within which they may lead their lives in relative peace
and security. It is surely paradoxical that a theory that places such value
on communal welfare should pay so little attention to the needs of
existing and emergent multinational communities (to say nothing of the
international community as a whole) and, in so doing, ignore the close
links that exist between the well-being of those larger communities and
the well-being of the groups and individuals that compose them. In
short, the theory seems to attribute little significance to the relative
order and stability represented by existing state structures.
The point is not merely of theoretical interest. Given what
history and contemporary events tell us about the potential for intercommunal conflict, any principle that permits ethnic, cultural, and
religious groups to attempt the restructuring of existing state boundaries
by unilateral fiat would often lead to extensive turmoil and bloodshed, as
various groups struggled with state governments and one another to
achieve the most advantageous definition of their homelands.
To summarize, then, it does not appear plausible to argue that
the value of self-government for national groups is sufficiently greater
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overall than the value of current governmental arrangements for the
citizens of existing states as to justify a universal right of national selfdetermination. The best that can be said is that, in certain specific
circumstances, the interests of a national group in governing itself
substantially outweigh the interests of the larger collectivity in keeping
the state intact. In such cases, the national group may gain a right of
self-determination. It is not easy to enumerate the instances in which
such a right may arise. But situations of serious injustice, as where a
group is being oppressed or exploited by the central government, would
surely constitute the central case.
B. Territory
Under the communal theory, an encompassing group that
exercises its right of self-determination in favour of independence gains
title to the territory that it occupies, so long as it forms a substantial
majority-of the resident population. This title is good in international
law and prevails over that held by the former state.
What is the foundation of this new title? Margalit and Raz do
not devote much attention to the point. They appear to think, however,
that the title arises from the conjuncture of two factors: the value that
self-government holds for the group, and the group's factual occupation
of the territory as the majority population.31 The underlying reasoning
seems fairly straightforward. An encompassing group needs a territory
in order to realize the value that independent statehood potentially
offers. The fairest and most practical solution is to recognize that the
group holds a title to the territory in which it forms the predominant
population.
The communal theory thus offers a strikingly simple solution to
the vexed territorial question. However, as closer examination reveals,
this simplicity is achieved at substantial cost. Issues of territorial title
have traditionally been thought to be deeply rooted in history. In most
disputes over territory, the claims of the parties are bolstered by detailed
historical evidence that attempts to show an unbroken chain of title
extending as far back in time as is necessary to defeat rival claims. For
this preoccupation with the past, the communal theory offers a simple
substitute: head-counting. An encompassing group is entitled to the
territory in which it forms a substantial majority. As the authors remark,
31
We leave aside here the distinct case in which an encompassing group wishes to claim back
a territory from which it was unjustly expelled, as briefly discussed in ibid. at 459.
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"numbers count in the end."' 2
As a result, little significance is attached to existing territorial
boundaries, whether these be international or domestic. The relevant
territorial unit for purposes of self-determination is decided largely by
the demographic configuration of the encompassing group 33 It is
noteworthy that, in this respect, the theory is at odds with the
decolonization process carried out in Africa, India, and South-East Asia
after World War II, a process that is generally thought to provide the
main modem examples of self-determination. Decolonization was
usually implemented on the basis of existing colonial boundaries,
boundaries that showed little respect for the niceties of ethnic, cultural,
or religious homogeneity. Under the communal theory, for example, the
relevant units for purposes of self-determination in East Africa would
presumably not have been the colonial territories of Tanganyika,
Zanzibar, Kenya, and Uganda, but rather the numerous tribal and ethnic
groups that inhabited these territories and spilled untidily across their
boundaries into adjacent countries.
Likewise, according to the communal theory, the existing
Province of Quebec would probably not constitute a self-determining
unit, since it does not correspond to the boundaries of any single
encompassing group. Rather, the appropriate unit would appear to be
the territories occupied by the francophone population of southern
Quebec and eastern Ontario, with the possible addition of the Acadians
of northern New Brunswick (who, on the other hand, may qualify for
their own right of self-determination). It is a significant and telling fact
that this viewpoint does not correspond to the political programme of
any substantial group of francophones in Canada today.
This situation is not entirely surprising. However artificial and
inconvenient territorial boundaries may be, they are often the result of
long-standing historical compromises that are difficult to reverse without
considerable human cost. Consider, for example, the southern sector of
the boundary between the Provinces of Quebec and Ontario, which
dates back more than tvo hundred years. This line was the result of a
decision taken in 1791 to split the Old Province of Quebec into two
parts, so as to allow Upper Canada to develop as a predominantly
English-speaking and Protestant Province, while Lower Canada
remained largely French and Catholic. This decision had important
321bia at 458.
33 As noted earlier, an encompassing group is entitled to the territory in which it constitutes a

substantial majority. However, the authors also mention that in some situations "historical ties" will
prevail, as limited by the principle of prescription: see ibid. at 458-59.

728

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[voL 32 NO. 4

historical ramifications. In particular, it shielded the French community
in Quebec from the impact of the United Empire Loyalists who had
flooded across the border during the American Revolution. As such, it
played a major role in the subsequent development of Quebec and
indeed of Canada as a whole. Over the past two centuries, the areas on
either side of the border have been settled and developed on the
understanding that the line was permanent and served to delimit the
separate spheres of two distinct legal, political, and social systems. Yet,
according to the communal theory, these historical considerations
should be set aside in favour of the simple demographics of culture and
language.
This indifference to history manifests itself in another way. The
communal theory tacitly treats the territory of a state as a kind of terra
nullius, in which existing territorial title counts for nothing in the face of
the claims of national groups. This approach, of course, ignores the fact
that the existing state has a recognized international title to the territory
in question and, further, that its citizens may have strong collective and
individual interests in the maintenance of that title. The wealth and
future prospects of a state and its population are intimately connected
with its territory-its natural resources, geographical configuration,
access to rivers and seas, strategic location, agricultural wealth, industrial
potential, and so on. The territory of a state is not a homogeneous space
that can be divided and subdivided at will without regard to any factors
other than the number of people that happen to occupy it, as if it were a
large, uniformly drab dormitory. The natural and acquired assets of a
territory are often distributed quite unevenly, with some areas more
favoured than others. So long as a state remains intact, the varied
advantages offered by its regions are shared to some extent by the entire
population, through redistributive taxation, commercial and
employment opportunities, and so on. However, secession brings this
situation to an end. The seceding territory ceases to be the joint
patrimony of the populace as a whole and becomes the exclusive
preserve of its immediate residents. Moreover, the residual state finds
itself with new boundaries not of its own making, ones that may have
significant drawbacks.
So, in many cases, the threatened secession of a region gives rise
to serious and justified concerns on the part of the existing state and its
inhabitants, concerns that are directly related to the territorial question.
It is not a matter of indifference to the people of Canada that Quebec
happens to sit astride the St. Lawrence River and Seaway, and that it
also separates the eastern part of Canada from Ontario and the West.
Likewise, the people of Quebec can hardly overlook the fact that the
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northern parts of the Province are rich in hydro-electric potential when
they contemplate the prospect that the Aboriginal. peoples of Northern
Quebec might assert their own rights of self-determination.
These reflections suggest a more general point. The communal
theory assumes in effect that the question of territorial title has little
autonomy in its own right, but is decided by the same considerations that
give a national group the authority to determine its international status.
In other words, if the group has a valid right of self-determination, it
automatically has the potential to acquire a valid territorial title. But
this seems to confuse and possibly reverse the order of priorities. A
significant factor in determining whether a national group has a right of
self-determination should surely be the merits of its territorial claim as
compared to that of the existing state. At the least, it should be
recognized that the two questions are autonomous, even if closely
intertwined, and that the answer to one does not necessarily determine
the answer to the other.
To sum up, the connection between the right of selfdetermination and territorial title is far more complex than the
communal theory concedes. A claim of national self-determination
presents in effect a territorial claim that rivals that of the original state, a
claim that needs to be assessed on its own merits and not simply as a
function of other questions. Moreover, it would appear that the
interests of the existing state and its population in maintaining the
integrity of its territory are sufficiently strong to justify awarding
presumptive priority to its existing title, a title that could be defeated
only by strong countervailing considerations.
C. Allegiance
The communal theory attaches great significance to the bonds
between individuals and national groups, bonds of a cultural, linguistic,
religious, or historical character. In its view, the importance of these
communal bonds is such that the national group has the right to protect
and reinforce them by opting for independence. This approach could
perhaps be criticized for its tendency to portray people primarily as
group members and to downplay their status as autonomous individuals.
However, that criticism will not be advanced here. Rather, the
communal theory will be faulted, not for any supposed disregard of
individual rights, but for being in a sense insufficiently communal.
Far from encouraging the cultivation and growth of extensive
and multilayered communal bonds, the theory tends to promote a
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telescoping of communal horizons and a narrowing of shared
allegiances. In effect, the theory fails to take proper account of the wide
range of overlapping communities that may properly have claims on our
loyalties, from the family, the kin group, the neighbourhood, the school,
the church or temple, the workplace, and the club, on upwards to the
ethnic nation, the province, the state, the religious denomination, and
the universal community composed of humanity as a whole. In
considering the multiplicity of these allegiances and the varying
importance they may have for individual self-identity and well-being, we
may begin to doubt whether the claims of any single "encompassing
group" should be privileged to the extent suggested, and to wonder in
any case how such a group might be identified.
Some of these doubts are reinforced when we attempt to apply
the theory in concrete factual contexts. Take the relatively common
situation where national groups nest within other national groups like
Russian dolls. In Canada, for example, anglophones constitute a
substantial majority of the country's population as a whole,
francophones are the strong majority in the Province of Quebec, and
various groups of Aboriginal peoples predominate in certain parts of the
Province. Under the communal theory, all of these groups arguably
qualify as "encompassing groups" and so all alike hold rights of selfdetermination. However, if these rights were to be exercised
concurrently, they might well lead to contradictory results. For example,
a Canada-wide referendum might reject the option of Quebec
independence, while a Quebec-wide referendum supports it. Or a
Quebec-wide referendum might reject a proposal for the independence
of Northern Quebec, while a referendum in Northern Quebec endorses
it. How should such conflicts be resolved?
The logic of the communal theory seems to be that the smaller
unit takes precedence over the larger. The potential value of selfgovernment for a national group is such that it is entitled to opt for
secession notwithstanding the wishes of a larger national group that
enfolds it. Thus, while anglophone Canada may have a right of selfdetermination, it has no right to prevent francophone Quebec from
exercising its corresponding right, and Quebec in its turn has no right to
negate the rights held by various Aboriginal peoples in Quebec-and so
on. Indeed, there seem to be few effective limits to the fragmentation
permitted by the theory. So long as a group possesses a pervasive
culture that is central to the self-identity and well-being of its members,
that group is entitled to determine the political future of its territory.
Thus, Mennonite communities in Ontario, Doukhobor settlements in
the Western Provinces, as well as anglophone communities in Quebec
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and francophone communities throughout the rest of Canada (to
identify only the most obvious cases) would presumably all qualify for a
right of self-determination.
In apparent recognition of this difficulty, Margalit and Raz
attempt to put a brake on the theory's divisive tendencies. They affirm
that the right of self-determination cannot vest in small face-to-face
groups whose members are known personally to all other members. For
a group to qualify, it must be an anonymous entity in which mutual
recognition is secured by the possession of general characteristics, such
as distinctive manners or a special vocabulary, rather than personal
knowledge 34 However, in the context of the authors' general approach,
this limitation is not convincing. While small, face-to-face communities
no doubt differ from larger, more anonymous groupings, there does not
seem to be any cogent reason why personal familiarity among the
members should prevent a right of self-determination from arising, at
least according to the theory's own criteria. To the contrary, the
importance of group membership to individual self-identity and wellbeing may be significantly greater in some small face-to-face groups than
in larger ones, so that, in the theory's own terms, the case for selfgovernment is correspondingly stronger. In short, there do not appear
to be any grounds within the communal theory for resisting the
splintering that it permits. Such grounds can only be found by looking
beyond the theory to a range of values and allegiances that it does not
consider.
More generally, then, in its concern to further the welfare of
encompassing groups, the theory underestimates the need to safeguard
and advance the welfare of mixed and multinational communities, to say
nothing of the international community as a whole. In particular, the
theory does not permit a finer-grained analysis that takes account of the
multiple allegiances, commitments, and responsibilities that people
have, the varying weights to be assigned to these bonds, and the need to
preserve and foster the growth of governmental and international
structures that permit these multiple allegiances to coexist and flourish,
each within its proper sphere.
The political system best able to satisfy this 'need is one that
recognizes multiple centres of authority and erects strong barriers
against their invasion and suppression. In many cases, this would
suggest some form of federal system. However, the communal theory is
unfriendly to such systems. Under its principles, federations would be
inherently unstable, always open to fragmentation at the hands of a
34

1bid. at 447.
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single national component, and highly vulnerable to political blackmail
in the form of secession threats. Not only would the theory promote the
dissolution of multinational federations, it would discourage their
formation from the start, for the incentive to enter into federal unions
would greatly diminish, given their inherent instability.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, then, the communal theory suffers from three basic
deficiencies. First, it gives a rather one-dimensional account of the
complex factors that enter into any assessment of the rival claims of
authority advanced by states and secessionist national groups. In
particular, the theory downplays the values of stability and order
represented by existing arrangements, and ignores the widespread
disorder likely to result from awarding encompassing groups the right to
alter those arrangements unilaterally. Second, the theory does not deal
adequately with the question of territorial title or take proper account of
the legitimate interests and expectations that territorial title stands for.
Third, in its concern to further the welfare of national groups, the theory
underestimates the need to safeguard and advance the welfare of mixed
and multinational communities, and to encourage the emergence of
governmental structures that permit various communal allegiances to
hold sway within their several spheres.
Our inquiry also suggests a more general conclusion. The
concept of a universal right of national self-determination, on the model
of universal human rights, fails to reflect adequately the complex issues
that arise in concrete cases of proposed secession, and suppresses
awareness of the wide range of competing values and interests at stake.
In this area, "rights-talk" tends to produce simplified, somewhat
schematic portrayals of what are in reality highly complicated human
problems, with multiple historical, political, legal, and moral dimensions.
For example, as noted earlier, the stability of existing
constitutional and territorial arrangements has a certain worth in itself,
even if this clearly needs to be weighed against other considerations,
such as the basic demands of justice. However, the importance of
stability is difficult to express convincingly in the language of rights. To
say that people have a "right" to a certain measure of constitutional
stability in their lives seems false or exaggerated, or somehow does not
strike the right note. It seems more natural to say that people have a
certain interest in the existence of stable arrangements, or that such
arrangements have a certain value. This interest must, of course, be
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assessed alongside other factors. But it should clearly figure
prominently in any discussion of a proposed secession. Remaining
within the charmed circle of "rights-talk" tends to prevent this.
As this example suggests, then, the concept of a universal "right
of national self-determination" seems inadequate to the task of
capturing the full range of historical, political, legal, and moral
considerations that arise whenever a national group asserts the right to
secede from an existing state. In a word, the right of national selfdetermination should not be viewed as a universal right, on the model of
basic human rights; it is a right that arises only in specific historical
circumstances, the precise configuration of which cannot readily be
determined in advance.
Looking back now at the words of William Dunning, quoted at
the beginning of this paper, we may regret our haste in dismissing them
out of hand. Perhaps, after all, there is something to be said for the view
that authority is prior to liberty.and equality, if by that we mean that a
modicum of domestic and international order (and the authority needed
to support it) is the necessary precondition of any worthwhile forms of
individual and communal flourishing. However, more fundamental than
the issue of authority is the question of what bonds unite us as human
beings and members of the universal society, and how these bonds can
be reconciled and harmonized with our ties to the range of particular
communities that nurture and sustain us, from the family and local
neighbourhood to the church, the linguistic group, the ethnic nation, and
the state. Here, it seems fair to say, we still have much to learn.
However, history provides at least one important lesson. The human
need for community can never be fully satisfied by a single, allencompassing group, no matter how rich or pervasive its culture.
Indeed, such a group would stifle the deep-seated need for a broad and
varied range of communal bonds that overlap and intersect, jostling
among themselves for our allegiance. In a word, community demands
communities.

